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Abstract
In this paper we analyze how the optimal consumption, investment and life insur-
ance rules are modified by the introduction of a class of time-inconsistent preferences.
In particular, we account for the fact that an agent’s preferences evolve along the
planning horizon according to her increasing concern about the bequest left to her
descendants and about her welfare at retirement. To this end, we consider a stochas-
tic continuous time model with random terminal time for an agent with a known
distribution of lifetime under heterogeneous discounting. In order to obtain the time-
consistent solution, we solve a non-standard dynamic programming equation. For the
case of CRRA and CARA utility functions we compare the explicit solutions for the
time-inconsistent and the time-consistent agent. The results are illustrated numeri-
cally.
Abstract
En aquest treball s’analitza l’efecte que comporta l’introduccio´ de prefere`ncies
inconsistents temporalment sobre les decisions o`ptimes de consum, inversio´ i compra
d’asseguranc¸a de vida. En concret, es prete´n recollir la creixent importa`ncia que un
individu do´na a la here`ncia que deixa i a la riquesa disponible per a la seva jubilacio´ al
llarg de la seva vida laboral. Amb aquesta finalitat, es parteix d’un model estoca`stic
en temps continu amb temps final aleatori, i s’introdueix el descompte heterogeni,
considerant un agent amb una distribucio´ de vida residual coneguda. Per tal d’obtenir
solucions consistents temporalment es resol una equacio´ de programacio´ dina`mica no
esta`ndard. Per al cas de funcions d’utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA es troben solucions
expl´ıcites. Finalment, els resultats obtinguts s’il·lustren nume`ricament.
JEL classification: C61; G11; D91
Keywords: heterogeneous discounting; consumption and portfolio rules; life insurance;
time-consistency
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1 Introduction
The introduction of an uncertain lifetime in portfolio optimization models has proved to
be useful in the study of the demand for life insurance, which has usually been derived
from a bequest function. The starting point for modern research on the subject dates
back to Yaari (1965) who studied the problem of life insurance in a deterministic financial
environment with the stochastic time of death as the only source of uncertainty. Later on,
Richard (1975) combined the portfolio optimization model in Merton (1969, 1971) with
the model in Yaari (1965) to deal with a life-cycle consumption/investment problem in
the presence of life insurance and random terminal time. However, the model introduced
by Richard (1975) had several unsatisfactory aspects. First, the value function was not
well-defined at the final time because the random variable used to model the lifetime was
assumed to be bounded. This is a very important point in view of the fact that the problem
was analyzed using a dynamic programming approach, which proceeds backward in time.
Second, as Leung (1994) pointed out, there is a problem with the existence of interior
solutions. In order to overcome these difficulties, Pliska and Ye (2007) incorporated the
randomness of the planning horizon by means of the uncertain life model found in reliability
theory. In contrast to Richard (1975), in which the random lifetime took values on a
bounded interval, in that paper the authors considered an intertemporal model and allowed
the random lifetime to take values on [0,∞). In addition, the authors refined the theory
in the following ways. First, the planning horizon was considered to be some fixed point
in the future T (the retirement time for the decision maker) in contrast with the model in
Richard (1975) in which the planning horizon was interpreted as the finite upper bound
on the lifetime. Second, at T a utility was introduced accounting for the agent wealth
at the final time. After setting up the HJB equation and deriving the optimal feedback
control law, Pliska and Ye (2007) obtained explicit solutions for the family of discounted
CRRA utilities. As it is customary in the analysis of intertemporal decision problems, the
decision maker considered was characterized by a constant discount rate of time preference,
i.e., she discounted the stream of utilities of any category using an exponential discount
function with a constant discount rate of time preference according to the Discounted
Utility (DU) model introduced in Samuelson (1937). Within this framework, the marginal
rate of substitution between payments at different times depends only on the length of the
time interval contemplated, being this fact probably the main limitation of the DU model
with regard to its capacity to describe the actual time preference patterns.
In fact, the empirical findings on individual behavior seem to challenge some of the
predictions of the standard discounting model (see Frederick et al. (2002) for a review of
the literature until then). For this reason, variable rates of time preference have received
an increasing attention in recent years, in attempts to capture the reported anomalies.
In this sense, for instance, several papers focused on the greater impatience of decision
makers about the choices in the short run compared with those in the long term using
the hyperbolic discount function introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968). Along the same
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lines, Karp (2007) and Mar´ın-Solano and Navas (2010) dealt with the problem with non-
constant discounting. Also, in a recent paper by Ekeland et al. (2012), the model of Pliska
and Ye (2007) was extended with the introduction of non-constant discount rates.
The choice of the discount function will depend, in general, on the problem under
consideration. For instance, in intertemporal problems with a bequest motive, like those
studying the demand for life insurance, it is useful to account for the fact that the agent
concern about the bequest left to her descendants is not the same when she is young than
when she is an adult. A similar effect could be considered in retirement and pension mod-
els, in which the willingness to save for a better retirement is likely to be greater at the end
of the working life than at the beginning. In addition, for such a long planning horizon the
greater impatience in the short run may still play a role, although this bias should evolve
according to the different valuations over time of the bequest and the pension plan. In or-
der to capture this asymmetric valuation Mar´ın-Solano and Patxot (2012) introduced the
heterogeneous discounting model. According to these authors, the individual preferences
at time t take the form∫ T
t
e−δ(s−t)L(x(s), u(s), s) ds+ e−ρ(T−t)F (x(T ), T ) , (1)
i.e., the agent uses a constant discount rate of time preference, but this rate is different for
the instantaneous utilities L(x(s), u(s), s) and for the final function F (x(T ), T ) which, in
the previous examples, would account for the bequest or the agent wealth at retirement.
The most relevant effect of using any non-constant discount function is that preferences
change with time. Impatient agents over-valuing instantaneous utilities in comparison with
the final function are characterized by ρ > δ in equation (1). However, as we approach the
end of the planning horizon T the relative value of the final function increases compared
with the instantaneous utilities and consequently, the bias to the present decreases with
time (see Mar´ın-Solano and Patxot (2012) and de-Paz et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion
of this effect).
The aim of this paper is to derive the optimal consumption, investment and life insur-
ance rules for an agent whose concern about both the bequest left to her descendants and
her wealth at retirement increases with time. To this end we depart from the model in
Pliska and Ye (2007) generalizing the individual time preferences by incorporating hetero-
geneous discount functions. In contrast to the extension of Pliska and Ye’s (2007) model
in Ekeland et al. (2012), where an intergenerational problem is introduced by assigning
different discount functions to different generations, our setting of heterogeneous discount-
ing focuses on the time preference dynamics of the decision maker, i.e., our setting faces
an intragenerational problem. In addition, following Kraft (2003), we derive the wealth
process in terms of the portfolio elasticity with respect to the traded assets. This approach
allows us to introduce options in the investment opportunity set as well as to enlarge it
by any number of contingent claims while maintaining the analytical tractability of the
model. Finally, we analyze how the standard solutions are modified depending on the
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attitude of the agent towards her changing preferences, showing the differences with some
numerical illustrations.
In effect, the individual facing the problem of maximizing (1) can act in two differ-
ent ways. On the one hand, she could solve the problem by ignoring the fact that her
preferences are going to change in the near future, and applying the classical HJB equa-
tion. In this case, the strategies obtained will be only optimal from the point of view
of her preferences at time t and, in general, will be only obeyed at that time; therefore
they are time-inconsistent. On the other hand, she could take into account her chang-
ing preferences and obtain the time-consistent strategies by calculating Markov Perfect
Equilibria (MPE). These different solutions are usually referred to as naive (in general
time-inconsistent) and sophisticated (time-consistent) in the non-constant discounting lit-
erature. In order to obtain the MPE, Mar´ın-Solano and Patxot (2012) derived the Dynamic
Programming Equation (DPE) in a deterministic framework following a variational ap-
proach. The extension to the stochastic case, in which the state dynamics is described by a
set of diffusion equations of the form dx(t) = f(x(t), u(t), t) dt+σ(x(t), u(t), t)dz(t), where
z(t) is a standard Wiener process, was studied in de-Paz et al. (2011). In that paper the
DPE providing time-consistent solutions was derived following two different approaches.
The first one consisted in obtaining the DPE for the heterogeneous discounting problem
in discrete time and then taking the formal continuous time limit, following Karp (2007)
for the non-constant discounting problem in a deterministic setting (see Mar´ın-Solano and
Navas (2010) for the stochastic case). The second one was the variational approach, as
in Mar´ın-Solano and Patxot (2012) (which is based on Ekeland and Lazrak (2010)). It is
important to remark that, despite the fact that the two approaches are different in nature,
the equilibrium conditions coincide.
According to de-Paz et al. (2011), if V (x, t) is the value function of the time-consistent
(sophisticated) agent for the problem of maximizing (1) subject to the corresponding state
equation, and assuming that it is of class C2,1, then V (x, t) satisfies the following DPE
ρV (x, t)− Vt(x, t)−K(x, t) = (2)
= sup
{u}
{
L(x, u, t) + Vx(x, t)f(x, u, t) +
1
2
tr
(
σ(x, u, t) · σ′(x, u, t) · Vxx(x, t)
)}
,
where
K(x, t) = (ρ− δ)E
[∫ T
t
e−δ(s−t)L(xs, φ(xs, s), s) ds
]
(3)
with V (x, T ) = F (x, T ), and being φ(xs, s) the equilibrium rule . The subscripts denote
the partial derivative. If, for each pair (x, t), there exists a decision rule u∗ = φ(x, t), with
corresponding state trajectory x∗(t), such that u∗ maximizes the right hand side term of
(2), then u∗ = φ(x, t) is the Markov equilibrium rule for the problem with heterogeneous
discounting.
It is worth mentioning that, unlike the standard DPE, a new term K(x, t) appears
in (2). Checking equation (3) it is obvious that K(x, t) = 0 in the standard discounting
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case (δ = ρ). By differentiating (3) with respect to t we obtain an “auxiliary dynamic
programming equation”
δK(x, t)−Kt(x, t) = (δ − ρ)L(x, φ(x, t), t) +Kx(x, t) · f(x, φ(x, t), t)+
+
1
2
tr
(
σ(x, φ(x, t), t) · σ′(x, φ(x, t), t) ·Kxx(x, t)
)
, (4)
so that instead of solving (2) and (3), the solution can be characterized by solving the
system of partial differential equations (2) and (4) with the corresponding boundary con-
ditions V (x, T ) = F (x, T ), and K(x, T ) = 0.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model we
want to address describing the underlying financial and insurance market as well as the
optimal control problem to be solved. In Section 3, we consider the case of CRRA and
CARA utility functions and we discuss the time-consistency of the solutions obtained.
In Section 4, we provide some numerical illustrations of the main results, comparing our
solutions with the standard ones. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a decision maker with a working life that extends from t0 to T years who is
subject to a mortality risk. Let τ ∈ [0,∞) be a random variable defined on a given
probability space (Ω,F ,P) representing the agent time of death. We assume that τ has
a known distribution function F (τ) and density function F ′(τ) = f(τ). At each time
t ∈ [t0,min{T, τ}], the agent has to decide how to allocate her personal wealth W (t)
between consumption, investment, and life insurance purchase.
The consumption process rate is denoted by c(t). Obviously, the agent enjoys con-
sumption as long as she is alive, i.e., for all t ≤ min{T, τ}. The life insurance contract
can be purchased by the agent by paying premiums per euro of coverage for age t at a
rate denoted by p(t). We assume that contracts of this kind are offered continuously in
the insurance market. If Q(t) denotes the total amount of life insurance purchased, the
total premium paid at time t is p(t)Q(t). In addition to consumption and purchase of a
life insurance policy, we assume that the agent invests the full amount of her savings in a
financial market. Let us briefly derive the wealth process when the market comprises two
securities, one risk-free and the other risky. The risk-free asset price M(t) is assumed to
evolve according to dM(t) = M(t)rdt, where r > 0 and M(t0) = m > 0, while the risky
asset follows a geometric Brownian motion described by
dP (t) = P (t)µdt+ P (t)σdz(t) ,
where P (t0) = p > 0 and z(t) is a standard Brownian motion process defined on (Ω,F ,P).
Throughout the paper we assume that (Ω,F ,P) is a filtered probability space and that
its filtration {Ft, t ∈ [t0, T ]} is the P-augmentation of the filtration generated by z(t).
Besides the return on her investment, the agent receives her income at a rate i(t) until
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her retirement time or until her death time, whichever happens first. Denoting by w the
proportion of savings invested in the risky asset, the wealth process is described by the
stochastic differential equation
dW = [(r + w(µ− r))W + i(t)− c(t)− p(t)Q(t)] dt+ wσWdz(t) , (5)
defined on [t0,min{T, τ}], with W (t0) = W0.
Assume now that the opportunity set for investments is not only composed by the two
securities described above but that an option C(t, P (t)) on the stock is also available in the
market. The introduction of options and other derivatives is a natural generalization of the
standard portfolio problem due to their wide use as investment opportunities. However,
the extension of the stochastic optimal control approach leads to a much more complicated
form of the HJB equation, since the option price C(t, P (t)) is a non-linear function of the
underlying stock price. Kraft (2003) proposed a kind of two step procedure that greatly
simplifies the problem. By introducing the elasticity of the portfolio with respect to the
stock price, it is shown that this elasticity can be used as the control variable instead of the
share of wealth invested in each asset. Thus, in the first step, investment problems with
contingent claims of the form C(t, P (t)) can be solved as if the portfolio only contained a
risky security and a risk-free security (the reduced portfolio problem). Once the optimal
elasticity is obtained, the second step consists in calculating a portfolio tracking this
elasticity.
Therefore, according to the elasticity approach, the optimal wealth process can be
determined by the optimal elasticity of the portfolio with respect to the stock price. We
first define the elasticity of the option price with respect to the price of the underlying,
C =
dC/C
dP/P
, where dC is obtained using Ito’s lemma
dC =
(
Ct + CPPµ+
1
2
CPPP
2σ2
)
dt+ CPPσdz(t) . (6)
An application of the Black-Scholes partial differential equation, Ct+CPPr+
1
2CPPP
2σ2−
Cr = 0, leads to
dC = (rC + (µ− r)CPP ) dt+ CPPσdz(t) ,
so that C =
dC/C
dP/P =
CPP
C and equation (6) becomes
dC = C [(r + C(µ− r))dt+ Cσdz(t)] .
Let wP and wC denote the proportion of the wealth invested in the risky asset and in
the call option, respectively. The remainder 1−wP −wC is the proportion invested in the
risk-free security. In this case, the wealth process is described by
dW = [(r + (wP + wCC)(µ− r))W + i(t)− c(t)− p(t)Q(t)] dt+
+(wP + wCC)σWdz(t) . (7)
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In addition, the portfolio’s elasticity with respect to the stock price is defined as the
weighted sum of the elasticities of the portfolio components  = (1−wP −wC)M +wP P +
wCC . Since P = 1 and M = 0 respectively, we have
 = wP + wCC ,
and the stochastic differential equation describing the wealth process can be written in
terms of the elasticity of the investor’s portfolio provided that w = (wP , wC) is hold
constant (static elasticity), i.e.,
dW = [(r + (µ− r))W + i(t)− c(t)− p(t)Q(t)] dt+ σWdz(t) , (8)
for t ∈ [t0,min{T, τ}], with W (t0) = W0.
Note that the only difference between equations (8) and (5) is that the control variable
w in (5) is replaced by the static elasticity  in (8). In addition, since  is independent of
a particular asset, the opportunity set for investment can be enlarged by any number of
contingent claims.
The problem for the wage earner is then to choose the consumption, portfolio elasticity
and life insurance rules so as to maximize
max
{c,,Q}
E
[∫ T∧τ
t
e−δ(s−t)U(cs)ds+ e−ρ(τ−t)B(Z(τ), τ)1Iτ≤T+
+e−ρ(T−t)L(W (T ))1Iτ>T | τ > t,Ft
]
, (9)
where T ∧ τ ≡ min{T, τ}; 1IA is the indicator function of event A; U(c) is the utility
derived from consumption; L(W (T )) denotes the utility derived from the wealth available
for retirement in case of being alive at T ; and B(Z(τ), τ) is the utility from the legacy left
to her descendants in case of dying before retirement, with Z(τ) = W (τ)+Q(τ). Functions
U(·), B(·) and L(·) are assumed to be strictly concave functions on their arguments.
Note that the discount function is the same for B(Z(τ), τ) and L(W (T )), which are
the final functions depending on dying before retirement or not, and it is different from
the discount function for the utility derived form consumption, with ρ > δ. In contrast
to intergenerational models, in which different generations can be modeled by introducing
different discount functions (as in the case of hyperbolic discounting), we are interested
in modeling the individual’s increasing concern about his/her bequest and his/her wealth
available for retirement, i.e., from an intragenerational point of view. As discussed in de-
Paz et al. (2011), this asymmetric valuation can not be described by standard exponential
discounting or hyperbolic discount functions.
Finally, if the mortality risk is independent of the financial risk, equation (9) with
random terminal time transforms into
max
{c,,Q}
E
[∫ T
t
(
S(s, t)e−δ(s−t)U(cs) + f(s, t)e−ρ(s−t)B(Z(s), s)
)
ds+
+S(T, t)e−ρ(T−t)L(W (T )) | Ft
]
=
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= max
{c,,Q}
1
S(t)
E
[∫ T
t
(
S(s)e−δ(s−t)U(cs) + f(s)e−ρ(s−t)B(Z(s), s)
)
ds+
+S(T )e−ρ(T−t)L(W (T )) | Ft
]
, (10)
where S(t) = 1 − F (t) denotes the survivor function, f(s, t) = f(s)S(t) is the conditional
density function, and S(s, t) = S(s)S(t) denotes the conditional survivor function.
3 The case of CRRA and CARA utility functions
In this section we derive explicit solutions for the problem (10) and (8) considering first,
utility functions with a constant relative risk aversion, and second, utility functions with
a constant absolute risk aversion. We then compare the standard solutions with the time-
inconsistent and with the time-consistent solutions for the problem with heterogeneous
discounting.
Let c∗,∗ and Q∗ denote the optimal consumption, portfolio elasticity and life insurance
purchase. Then the current value function at time t is
V¯ (W, t) =
1
S(t)
E
[∫ T
t
(
S(s)e−δ(s−t)U(c∗s) + f(s)e
−ρ(s−t)B(Z∗(s), s)
)
ds+
+S(T )e−ρ(T−t)L(W ∗(T )) | Ft
]
.
Throughout the paper we will work with the value function multiplied by the survivor
probability function V (W, t) = S(t)V¯ (W, t).
Note that, when transforming the functional (9) in (10), the utility function B(Z(s), s)
enters in the integral term and it can therefore be viewed as an instantaneous utility. In
order to have a constant discount rate for the instantaneous utilities different to that for
the final function, we rewrite the objective function (10) as follows. For each ω ∈ Ω, we
define a new state variable ytω(u) as
ytω(u) =
∫ u
t
f(s)e−ρ(s−u)B(Zω(s), s)ds .
For simplicity, in the following we will omit the subindex ω. Then, maximizing (10)
subject to (8) is equivalent to
max
{c,,Q}
1
S(t)
E
[∫ T
t
S(s)e−δ(s−t)U(cs)ds+ e−ρ(T−t)
[
yt(T ) + S(T )L(W (T ))
] | Ft] (11)
subject to (8) and to
y˙t(s) = ρyt(s) + f(s)B(Z(s), s) . (12)
As mentioned in the introduction, the wage earner solving problem (11) subject to (8)
and (12) can act in two different ways. The time-consistent agent must solve the DPE (2).
Otherwise, the naive agent making decisions at time t without taking into account that
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her preferences change with time will maximize (11) subject to (8) and (12) by solving
the standard HJB equation
δV (yt,W, s)− Vs(yt,W, s) = max{c,,Q}
{
S(s)U(c) +
[
ρyt(s) + f(s)B(Z(s), s)
]
Vyt(y
t,W, s) +
+ [(r + (µ− r))W + i(t)− c(t)− p(t)Q(t)]VW (yt,W, s) + 1
2
2σ2W 2VWW (y
t,W, s)
}
.
(13)
The difference between this solution and the solution in the standard case (ρ = δ)
comes from the boundary condition used in each problem. While in the standard case the
boundary condition is V (yt,W, T ) = yt(T )+S(T )L(W (T )), the value function at T for the
time-inconsistent agent, in its current value form, is V (yt,W, T ) = e−(ρ−δ)(T−t)(yt(T ) +
S(T )L(W (T )). This boundary condition changes depending on the moment t at which the
solution is calculated. In fact, an agent acting in this way constructs her solution by solving
the HJB equation (13) together with the family of boundary conditions V (yt,W, T ) =
e−(ρ−δ)(T−t)(yt(T ) + S(T )L(W (T )) for t ∈ [t0, T ] and patching together the solutions
obtained. In order to highlight the moment at which the problem is solved, in the following
we will denote the value function for the time-inconsistent (naive) agent by V t(yt,W, s).
In addition, we will omit the superscript t in yt(s).1
3.1 Logarithmic utility function
Consider first the case of logarithmic utility functions
U(cs) = ln cs , B(Z(s), s) = a lnZ(s) , and L(W (T )) = b lnW (T ), (14)
where a and b are positive real parameters. Let us briefly derive the time-inconsistent
strategy solving equation (13) at some particular time t ∈ [t0, T ], i.e., with the boundary
condition
V t(y,W, T ) = e−(ρ−δ)(T−t)(y(T ) + bS(T ) lnW (T )) . (15)
From the maximization problem in (13) one easily obtains
ct(s) =
S(s)
V tW
, t(s) =
−(µ− r)
σ2W
V tW
V tWW
, Qt(s) = a
f(s)
p(s)
V ty
V tW
−W , (16)
and by guessing V t(y,W, s) = αt(s) ln(W + βt(s)) + ϕt(s)y these rules become ct(s) =
S(s)
αt(s)(W + β
t(s)), t(s) = (µ1−r)
σ2W
(W + βt(s)) and Q(s)t = af(s)ϕ
t(s)
p(s)αt(s) (W + β
t(s))−W where
1In the optimal solution from the viewpoint of the t0-agent, t = t0 in equation (11) (the so called
precommitment solution in the literature of hyperbolic discounting), one should add the initial condition
yt0(t0) = 0 in (12). The same initial condition is considered in the time-consistent solution. On the
contrary, in the naive solution, the initial condition in the problem for each t-agent is yt(t) = 0, for every
t.
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αt(s) = bS(T )e−ρ(T−t)+δ(s−t) +
∫ T
s
(
e−δ(τ−s)S(τ) + e−ρ(τ−t)+δ(s−t)f(τ)
)
dτ
and
βt(s) =
∫ T
s
e−
∫ u
s (r+p(v))dvi(u)du , ϕt(s) = e−(ρ−δ)(s−t) .
From the above expressions for αt(s), βt(s), and ϕt(s), it becomes clear that our
guessing for the value function is consistent.
Therefore, either the agent is able to commit herself to following the decisions initially
taken at t0 or the rules above will be only obeyed at the time at which they have been
calculated, i.e., s = t. Thus, either
αt0(s) = bS(T )e−ρ(T−t0)+δ(s−t0) +
∫ T
s
(
e−δ(τ−s)S(τ) + e−ρ(τ−t0)+δ(s−t0)f(τ)
)
dτ
and ϕt0(s) = e−(ρ−δ)(s−t0) or
αt(t) = bS(T )e−ρ(T−t) +
∫ T
t
(
e−δ(τ−t)S(τ) + e−ρ(τ−t)f(τ)
)
dτ , ϕt(t) = 1 .
respectively. With respect to function βt(s), since it does not depend on the moment t, it
coincides whether or not the agent can commit herself (βt(s) = βt0(s) = βs(s)).
Now we turn the attention to the time-consistent strategy.
Proposition 1 Assume that U(cs), B(Z(s), s), and L(W (T )) are given by (14). Then
V (y,W, t) = α(t) ln(W + β(t)) + ϕ(t)y, and the optimal controls are given by
c∗(t) =
S(t)
α(t)
(W + β(t)) , ∗(t) =
(µ− r)
σ2W
(W + β(t)) ,
Q∗(t) = a
f(t)
p(t)
ϕ(t)
α(t)
(W + β(t))−W , (17)
where
α(t) = bS(T )e−ρ(T−t) +
∫ T
t
(
e−δ(s−t)S(s) + e−ρ(s−t)f(s)
)
ds , ϕ(t) = 1 ,
β(t) =
∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t (r+p(v))dvi(s)ds . (18)
Proof: According to Proposition 1 in de-Paz et al. (2011), a time-consistent solution can
be obtained by solving the DPE (2), which in this specific case becomes
ρV (y,W, t)−K(W, t)− Vt(y,W, t) = max{c,,Q}{S(t) ln c+ [ρy + af(t) lnZ(t)]Vy(y,W, t)+
+ [(r + (t)(µ− r))W + i(t)− c(t)− p(t)Q(t)]VW (y,W, t) + 1
2
(t)2σ2W 2VWW (y,W, t)} ,
(19)
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with K(W, t) given by
K(W, t) = (ρ− δ)E
[∫ T
t
e−δ(s−t)S(s) ln c∗(s)ds
]
, (20)
where c∗(s) is the equilibrium consumption rule obtained by solving the right hand side in
(19). In particular, by applying Corollary 1 in de-Paz et al. (2011), we obtain the system
of two coupled partial differential equations
ρV (y,W, t)−K(W, t)− Vt(y,W, t) = max{c,,Q}{S(t) ln c+ [ρy + af(t) lnZ(t)]Vy(y,W, t)+
+ [(r + (µ− r))W + i(t)− c(t)− p(t)Q(t)]VW (y,W, t) + 1
2
2σ2W 2VWW (y,W, t)} , (21)
and
δK(W, t)−Kt(W, t) = (ρ− δ)S(t) ln c+ [(r + (µ− r))W+
+i(t)− c(t)− p(t)Q(t)]KW (W, t) + 1
2
2σ2W 2KWW (W, t) . (22)
We guess a solution of the form V (y,W, t) = α(t) ln(W+β(t))+ϕ(t)y, with V (y,W, T ) =
y(T )+bS(T ) ln(W (T )), for the value function and of the form K(W, t) = A(t) ln(W+β(t)),
with K(W,T ) = 0, for the function K(W, t). If theses choices prove to be consistent, from
the maximization problem in (21) we have that the guessed optimal policies are given by
(17). Substituting into (21) and (22), we obtain that the functions α(t), β(t), ϕ(t) must
satisfy
α˙(t)−ρα(t) = A(t)−S(t)−af(t)ϕ(t) , β˙(t)−(µ+p(t))β(t) = i(t) , ϕ˙(t) = 0 ,
together with the boundary conditions α(T ) = bS(T ), β(T ) = 0, ϕ(T ) = 1. Solving these
equations we get (18). 
With respect to the function A(t), we find that must satisfy A˙(t)−δA(t) = −(ρ−δ)S(t),
with A(T ) = 0. Thus,
A(t) =
∫ T
t
e−δ(s−t)(ρ− δ)S(s)ds .
Note that this solution coincides with the a priori time-inconsistent solution. This
feature, also arising in non-constant discounting problems (see Mar´ın-Solano and Navas
(2010)), is a property of the logarithmic utilities and it is not preserved for more general
utility functions such as the power utilities, as we analyze in the next subsection.
3.2 Power utility function
Next, let us study the problem for the case of power utilities
U(cs) =
cγs
γ
, B(Z(s), s) = a
Z(s)γ
γ
, and L(W (T )) = b
W (T )γ
γ
, (23)
with γ < 1, γ 6= 0. As in the previous subsection, we first solve equation (13) to obtain
the “optimal” solution from the point of view of the agent making decisions at time t
12
and then we distinguish between the case of acting under commitment and acting without
commitment.
We guess a value function of the form V t(y,W, s) = αt(s) (W+β
t(s))γ
γ + ϕ
t(s)y, with
V t(y,W, T ) = e−(ρ−δ)(T−t)
(
bS(T )W (T )
γ
γ + y(T )
)
. Then, by maximizing the right hand
side of equation (13) we obtain that the “optimal” control rules satisfy ct(s) =
(
αt(s)
S(s)
) 1
γ−1
(W+
βt(s)), t(s) = (µ−r)
σ2W (1−γ)(W + β
t(s)) and Qt(s) =
(
p(s)
af(s)
αt(s)
ϕt(s)
) 1
γ−1
(W + βt(s))−W , where
βt(s) =
∫ T
s
e−
∫ u
s (r+p(v))dvi(u)du , ϕt(s) = e−(ρ−δ)(s−t) ,
αt(s) = υ(s)γ−1
∫ T
s
υ(u)
S(u) 11−γ +(ae−(ρ−δ)(u−t)f(u)
p(u)γ
) 1
1−γ
 du+
+
(
e−(ρ−δ)(T−t)bS(T )
) 1
1−γ
υ(T )
]1−γ
,
with
υ(s) = exp
{
− 1
1− γ
∫ s
0
(
δ − 1
2
(µ− r)2
σ2(1− γ)γ − γr − γp(u)
)
du
}
,
so that our guessing for the value function is consistent.
Once again, the function βt(s) does not depend on t (the moment at which the deci-
sion is made) and therefore there is no difference between the committed and the time-
inconsistent agent. However, both αt(s) and ϕt(s) show the deviation between these two
different behaviors. While the agent who is able to commit herself will compute her
decision rule according to
αt0(s) = υ(s)γ−1
∫ T
s
υ(u)
S(u) 11−γ +(ae−(ρ−δ)(u−t0)f(u)
p(u)γ
) 1
1−γ
 du+
+
(
e−(ρ−δ)(T−t0)bS(T )
) 1
1−γ
υ(T )
]1−γ
and ϕt0(s) = e−(ρ−δ)(s−t0), the time-inconsistent agent will follow the decisions taken only
when they are calculated; so at s = t
αt(t) = υ(t)γ−1
∫ T
t
υ(u)
S(u) 11−γ +(ae−(ρ−δ)(u−t)f(u)
p(u)γ
) 1
1−γ
 du +
+
(
e−(ρ−δ)(T−t)bS(T )
) 1
1−γ
υ(T )
]1−γ
,
and ϕ(t) = 1.
With respect to the time-consistent solution, we have:
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Proposition 2 Assume that U(cs), B(Z(s), s), and L(W (T )) are given by (23). Then
V (y,W, t) = α(t) (W+β(t))
γ
γ +ϕ(t)y, K(W, t) = A(t)
(W+β(t))γ
γ , and the optimal controls are
given by
c∗(t) =
(
α(t)
S(t)
) 1
γ−1
(W + β(t)) , ∗(t) =
(µ− r)
σ2W (1− γ)(W + β(t)) ,
Q∗(t) =
(
p(t)
af(t)
α(t)
ϕ(t)
) 1
γ−1
(W + β(t))−W , (24)
where
β(t) =
∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t (r+p(v))dvi(s)ds , ϕ(t) = 1 , (25)
while functions α(t) and A(t) are the solution to the following system of differential equa-
tions
ρα(t)−A(t)− α˙(t) =
α(t)
γ
γ−1
[
(1− γ)
(
S(t)
1
1−γ +
(
af(t)
p(t)γ
) 1
1−γ
)]
+ γα(t)
[
1
2
(µ− r)2
σ2(1− γ) + r + p(t)
]
, (26)
δA(t)− A˙(t) = (S(t)) 11−γ
[
(ρ− δ)α(t) γγ−1 − γα(t) 1γ−1A(t)
]
+
+γA(t)
[
1
2
(µ− r)2
σ2(1− γ) + r + p(t)− p(t)
(
p(t)
af(t)
α(t)
) 1
γ−1
]
, (27)
with α(T ) = bS(T ), and A(T ) = 0.
Proof: To obtain the time-consistent solution we must solve the DPE (2). Specifically,
according to Corollary 1 in de-Paz et al. (2011) we must solve the set of DPE
ρV (y,W, t)−K(W, t)− Vt(y,W, t) = max{c,,Q}
{
S(t)
cγ
γ
+ [(r + (µ− r))W + i(t)−
−c(t)− p(t)Q(t)]VW (y,W, t) +
(
ρy + af(t)
cγ
γ
)
Vy(y,W, t) +
1
2
2σ2W 2VWW (y,W, t)
}
,
(28)
δK(W, t)−Kt(W, t) = (ρ− δ)S(t)c
γ
γ
+ [(r + (µ− r))W + i(t)− c(t)− p(t)Q(t)]KW (W, t) + 1
2
2σ2W 2KWW (W, t) . (29)
We try as a candidates for the value function and to the function K(W, t), V (y,W, t) =
α(t) (W+β(t))
γ
γ + ϕ(t)y and K(W, t) = A(t)
(W+β(t))γ
γ respectively. Maximizing the right
hand side of (28) we obtain (24). Finally, substituting the guessed functions and the cor-
responding optimal controls in (28-29), together with the terminal conditions V (y,W, T ) =
y(T ) + bS(T )W (T )
γ
γ and K(W,T ) = 0, we obtain that functions β(t) and ϕ(t) are given by
(25), while functions α(t) and A(t) are the solution to the system of differential equations
(26-27). 
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3.3 Exponential utility function
Finally, let us solve the problem for the case of (constant absolute risk aversion) exponential
utility functions
U(cs) =
−1
γ
e−γcs , B(Z(s), s) =
−a
γ
e−γZ(s) , and L(W (T )) = −be−γW (T ), (30)
with γ > 0. Once again, we first derive the “optimal” rules for the point of view of an
agent deciding at t ∈ [t0, T ] by means of equation (13). Then we differentiate between the
agent who is able to commit herself and the time-inconsistent agent.
By guessing V t(y,W, s) = −ae−γ(αt(s)+βt(s)W ) + ϕt(s)y, the maximization problem in
(13) gives
ct(s) = αt(s) + βt(s)W − 1
γ
ln
(
aγβt(s)
S(s)
)
, t(s) =
(µ− r)
σ2γβt(s)W
, (31)
Qt(s) = αt(s) + βt(s)W − 1
γ
ln
(
p(s)
f(s)
γβt(s)
ϕt(s)
)
−W . (32)
We substitute (31) and (32) in (13), and after several calculations, we obtain that the
functions αt(s), βt(s), and ϕt(s) satisfy
αt(s) =
−1
γ
[(
ln
(
b
a
S(T )
)
− (ρ− δ)(T − t)
)
e−
∫ T
s (1+p(v))β
t(v)dv +
+
∫ T
s
(
ϑt(u)e−
∫ u
s (1+p(v))β
t(v)dv
)
du
]
,
βt(s) =
1
e−
∫ T
s (r+p(v))dv +
∫ T
s
(
(1 + p(u))e−
∫ u
s (r+p(v))dv
)
du
, (33)
and ϕt(s) = e−(ρ−δ)(s−t), where
ϑt(u) = βt(u)
[
1 + p(u) + ln
(
aγβt(u)
S(u)
)
− p(u) ln
(
p(u)
f(u)
γβt(u)
ϕt(u)
)
− i(u)γ
]
−δ−1
2
(µ− r)2
σ2
.
Although the function βt(s) does not depend on t, and hence βt(s) = βt0(s) = βs(s),
the “optimal” policies change depending on whether the agent reconsiders her previous
decisions or is committed with the initial ones. In the last case, the decision maker will
compute her policies according to
αt0(s) =
−1
γ
[(
ln
(
b
a
S(T )
)
− (ρ− δ)(T − t0)
)
e−
∫ T
s (1+p(v))β(v)dv +
+
∫ T
s
(
ϑt0(u)e−
∫ u
s (1+p(v))β(v)dv
)
du
]
,
and ϕt0(s) = e−(ρ−δ)(s−t0). If she is not committed with the initial decisions, she will
be continuously modifying her calculated choices for the future. Consequently αt(s) and
ϕt(s) will be only obeyed at s = t, i.e.,
α(t) =
−1
γ
[(
ln
(
b
a
S(T )
)
− (ρ− δ)(T − t)
)
e−
∫ T
t (1+p(v))β(v)dv +
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+∫ T
t
(
ϑ(u)e−
∫ u
t (1+p(v))β(v)dv
)
du
]
,
and ϕ(t) = 1.
Next, let us derive the time-consistent solution.
Proposition 3 Assume that U(cs), B(Z(s), s), and L(W (T )) are given by (30). Then
V (y,W, t) = −ae−γ(α(t)+β(t)W ) + ϕ(t)y, K(W, t) = A(t)e−γ(α(t)+β(t)W ), and the optimal
controls are given by
c∗(t) = α(t) + β(t)W − 1
γ
ln
(
aγβ(t)
S(t)
)
, ∗(t) =
(µ− r)
σ2γβ(t)W
,
Q∗(t) = α(t) + β(t)W − 1
γ
ln
(
p(t)
f(t)
γβ(t)
ϕ(t)
)
−W , (34)
where
βt(s) =
1
e−
∫ T
s (r+p(v))dv +
∫ T
s
(
(1 + p(u))e−
∫ u
s (r+p(v))dv
)
du
, ϕ(t) = 1 , (35)
while functions α(t) and A(t) are the solution to the following system of differential equa-
tions
aγα˙(t) + aρ+A(t) = aβ(t)(1− γp(t))− a1
2
(µ− r)2
σ2
+
+
[
α(t)(1 + p(t))− 1
γ
(
ln
(
aγβ(t)
S(t)
)
+ p(t) ln
(
p(t)
f(t)
γβ(t)
))
+ i(t)
]
aγβ(t) , (36)
A˙(t)− δA(t)− γA(t)α˙(t) = a(ρ− δ)β(t) + 1
2
(µ1 − r)2
σ2
A(t)−
−
[
α(t)(1 + p(t))− 1
γ
(
ln
(
aγβ(t)
S(t)
)
+ p(t) ln
(
p(t)
f(t)
γβ(t)
))
− i(t)
]
γA(t)β(t) , (37)
with α(T ) =
−1
γ
ln
(
b
a
S(T )
)
, and A(T ) = 0.
Proof: According to Corollary 1 in de-Paz et al.(2011), Markov Perfect Equilibria can be
obtained by solving the set of two coupled PDE
ρV (y,W, t)−K(W, t)− Vt(y,W, t) =
max
{c,,Q}
{−1
γ
e−γcS(t) + [(r + (µ− r))W + i(t)− c(t)− p(t)Q(t)]VW (y,W, t)+ (38)
+
(
ρy + f(t)
−a
γ
e−γ(W+Q)
)
Vy(y,W, t) +
1
2
2σ2W 2VWW (y,W, t)
}
,
δK(W, t)−Kt(W, t) = (ρ− δ)−1
γ
e−γcS(t)+
+ [(r + (µ− r))W + i(t)− c(t)− p(t)Q(t)]KW (W, t) + 1
2
2σ2W 2KWW (W, t) . (39)
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We guess as a candidate to the value function V (y,W, t) = −ae−γ(α(t)+β(t)W ) + ϕ(t)y,
and with respect to K(W, t) we try K(W, t) = A(t)e−γ(α(t)+β(t)W ). If these choices proves
to be consistent, then from (38) we get (34). By substituting in (38-39) and collecting
terms in W , on the one hand, and collecting terms in x, on the other hand, we get that
β(t) and ϕ(t) are given by (35). With respect to the functions α(t) and A(t), we obtain
that they must be the solution to the system of differential equations (36-37). 
4 Numerical illustrations
In this section we provide some numerical examples to illustrate the results for the case
of power utility functions. As a baseline case, we consider a 25 years old agent endowed
with an initial wealth of 1000 euros and with an initial wage of 25000 euros which grows
at 3% every year until T = 65, when the agent retires. The agent exhibits a risk aversion
parameter of γ = −3 and her heterogeneous preferences are characterized by δ = 0.03
and ρ = 0.1. We assume that the individual is subject to an instantaneous force of
mortality or hazard rate given by the Gompert law of mortality λ(t) = 1he
(t−η)
h , t ≥ 0.
Following Milevsky (2006), we take η = 82.3 and h = 11.4. Due to the well-known
relationship between the hazard rate and the density and survivor probability functions
we have f(t) = λ(t)e−
∫ t
0 λ(s)ds and S(t) = e−
∫ t
0 λ(s)ds. Regarding the life insurance market,
we assume that the insurance company sets the premium in order to make a profit. In
general, the insurance is said to be actuarially fair when the expected profit rate equals 0,
which in this case means p(t) = λ(t). Consequently, in order to be profitable the insurance
company must charge a loading factor θ accounting for the percentage markup from the
fair value of insurance, i.e., p(t) = (1 + θ)λ(t). For this particular example we consider
θ = 10% so that the premium per euro of coverage at age t is p(t) = (1 + 0.1)λ(t). Finally,
we assume that the risk-free asset yields a return of r = 0.03 while the risky security has
an expected return of µ = 0.09 and volatility σ = 0.3.
Before comparing our solutions with the standard solutions, note that the agent makes
all her decisions according to her total available wealth (her current wealth W (t) plus the
present value of her future earnings β(t)). Although the present value of future earnings
has a positive effect in all the control variables, Figure 1 shows that in this case the current
wealth has a negative effect on the total amount of insurance purchased, i.e., the more
wealthy the agent is, the less life insurance she purchases. However, since the wage earner
has a a small current wealth relative to her future earnings, she depends on her wages
to make her decisions. Figure 2 shows the present value of future earnings, two possible
trajectories of the total available wealth together with the corresponding time-consistent
life insurance rule, and their expected values.
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Figure 1: Simulated W (t) (thick), expected W (t) (thick), simulated time-consistent life
insurance rule (thin) and expected time-consistent life insurance rule (thin).
Note that in spite of the negative current wealth, the amount of life insurance purchased
is enough to leave a positive bequest if premature death occurs.
Figure 2: Present value of future income (dashed). Two possible trajectories of the total
available wealth and the corresponding time-consistent life insurance rule (the thickness
reflects the correspondence). Smooth lines represents the expected values.
For this reason the following comparisons are made for different values of initial wage.
Figures 3 to 7 show the differences between standard and heterogeneous behaviors. At
the beginning of the planning horizon, the wage earner with heterogeneous discounting is
more impatient than the agent with standard discounting, since we have assumed ρ > δ.
However, as time goes on the bias to the present decreases as her concern about her bequest
and her retirement increases. In order to highlight how the heterogeneous preferences
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evolve over time, we focus first on the differences with the standard case from the point
of view of a 25 years old agent who is able to commit herself with the decisions initially
taken. Then we look at how these differences change if the agent reconsiders her choices
at any time (time-inconsistency), and we end by analyzing the differences from the point
of view of the time-consistent agent.
On the one hand, if the wage earner does not modify the decisions made at the age
of 25, when she underestimates the bequest left to her descendants and her wealth at
retirement, one should expect her to purchase less life insurance and to consume more
than the standard agent. On the other hand, if the agent does not commit herself, her
policies should change according to her preferences at different ages. Therefore, she should
purchase more life insurance and consume less than the committed agent. Finally, although
the time-consistent agent also overvalues the instantaneous utilities at the beginning of
the planing horizon, she knows that her preferences are going to change in the near future.
In this case, her policies should reflect the equilibrium between her preferences at different
times.
Figure 3 shows the difference of the life insurance purchased by the committed 25
years old agent and the standard discounting case. Departing from a similar level of life
insurance purchased, the difference is negative from that moment until the ages close to
the retirement date, when it becomes positive. This means that the individual using the
heterogeneous discount function postpones the purchase of life insurance when she is 25
years old to the later adulthood. Note that the deviation attains the maximum length
around the age of 50 and decreases from that point onwards. In addition, for a given age,
an increasing initial wage leads the agent to buy more life insurance under the standard
preferences than under the heterogeneous ones, except at ages closer to 65 years. In Figure
4, we compare the life insurance purchased by the time-inconsistent agent and the standard
solution. In this case, the difference is positive since the agent reconsiders her choice at
each time point according to her increasing concern about the bequest. The comparison
of the time-consistent and standard behaviors is shown in Figure 5. The difference is also
positive although it is larger than the difference in Figure 4, i.e., time-consistent planning
leads the agent to buy more life insurance than the time-inconsistent one. Note that,
in contrast to the committed agent, the agent with heterogeneous discounting (both the
time-inconsistent and the time-consistent) reacts to an increase in her salary by buying
more life insurance than the standard agent.
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Figure 3: Difference of optimal life insurance between the heterogeneous agent committed
with her preferences at the age of 25 and the standard agent for different values of initial
wage.
Figure 4: Difference of optimal life insurance between the time-inconsistent heterogeneous
agent and the standard agent for different values of initial wage.
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Figure 5: Difference of optimal life insurance between the time-consistent heterogeneous
agent and the standard agent for different values of initial wage.
In figure 6 we show the life insurance paths (simulated and expected values) for the
committed, the time-inconsistent and the time-consistent agent and for the baseline initial
wage (25000 euros).
Figure 6: Comparison of the optimal life insurance purchase for time-consistent (solid),
time-inconsistent (large dashing) and committed 25-years old (small dashing) agents.
Figure 7 highlights the deviation of consumption patterns for different initial wages.
Consumption brings immediate benefit so the heterogeneous agent, who is more impatient,
decides to allocate larger amounts to consumption at least in the first periods. The
committed agent ends up allocating larger amounts to consumption than the standard
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agent at all ages, since her path reflects the preferences from the perspective of the 25
years old. The time-inconsistent wage earner starts consuming more than the standard.
However, as time goes on she modifies (reduces) her previous choices according to her
decreasing bias to the present. As a result, her consumption path intersects the standard
one between the ages of 45 and 50, and ends in a lower level. Finally, the time-consistent
trajectory starts above the other three solutions and ends below them. This is so because
this agent makes her plan knowing how her preferences are going to evolve and she decides
to take advantage of the different levels of impatience at each time point. Thus, her
consumption is greater while she more impatient, since she knows that in the future her
preferences will lead her to consume less. Observe that an increase in the initial wage
shifts the curves upwards though, unlike the life insurance purchase, it hardly modifies
the differences between the four consumption paths.
Figure 7: Consumption paths for the standard case (dotted), the committed agent (large
dashing), the time-inconsistent agent (dot-dahsed) and the time-consistent agent (solid).
To conclude this section, we analyze how the time-consistent life insurance and con-
sumption rules are modified when we vary the heterogeneous preferences. Figures 8 and
9 show that the previous results are intensified if the discount rate for the final function
ρ is increased. For δ = 0.03 we plot the different paths taking ρ = 0.06, ρ = 0.15 and
ρ = 0.2. In particular, Figure 8 shows that the life insurance purchase increases with ρ,
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while Figure 9 shows that the consumption path rotates as ρ increases, i.e., the agent
consumes more when she is young and less when she is older.
Figure 8: Sensitivity of the time-consistent life insurance for different values of ρ, ρ = 0.06
(small dashing), ρ = 0.15 (large dashing), ρ = 0.2 (solid).
Figure 9: Sensitivity of the time-consistent consumption for different values of ρ, ρ = 0.06
(small dashing), ρ = 0.15 (large dashing), ρ = 0.2 (solid).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the effects of introducing heterogeneous discounting into a
stochastic continuous time model with random lifetime in which the wage earner decides
between three different strategies: consumption, investment and life insurance purchase.
In contrast with the standard case, heterogeneous preferences capture the different valu-
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ations that the individual gives to the bequest left to her descendants and to her wealth
at retirement along the planning horizon. Consequently, the optimal policies for an agent
using the heterogeneous discount function differ from those for an agent with standard
discounting. In order to illustrate these effects, we have departed from the model in
Pliska and Ye (2007) generalizing the individual time preferences with the heterogeneous
discount function introduced by Mar´ın-Solano and Patxot (2012). In addition, we have
derived the wealth dynamics in terms of the portfolio elasticity (Kraft (2003)). This pro-
cedure allows us to generalize the investment problem by introducing contingent claims
in the opportunity set while maintaining the analytical tractability of the model. Explicit
solutions have been obtained for the case of CRRA and CARA utility functions for both
the time-inconsistent and the time-consistent agent. The implications of the use of the
heterogeneous discount function have been illustrated, showing the differences between
our results and the standard ones.
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